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Abstract
Realism comes in many varieties, in science and elsewhere. Van Fraassens
inuential formulation took scientic realism to include the view that sci-
ence aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world
is like. So understood, a quantum realist takes quantum theory to aim at
correctly representing the world: many would add that its success justies
believing this representation is more or less correct. But quantum realism
has been understood both more narrowly and more broadly.
A pragmatist considers use prior to representation and this has prompted
some to dub pragmatist views anti-realist, including the view of quantum
theory I have been developing recently. But whether a pragmatist view
of quantum theory should be labeled anti-realist depends not only on its
ingredients but also on how that label should be applied. Pragmatism
o¤ers a healthy diet of quantum realism.
1 Introduction
Quantum theory has long presented a challenge to a would-be scientic realist
who maintains that the historical sequence of successful theories in a mature
science like physics o¤er increasingly accurate representations of a physical world
that is largely independent of our observational abilities and practices. Over the
past century, quantum theory has amassed an unparalleled record of successful
applications over an increasingly wide eld of science. But heated controversy
continues over whether, and if so how, it represents the world as distinct from
our observations of it.
Many philosophers seeking to secure the relation between scientic realism
and quantum theory have recently adopted overly narrow conceptions of both
relata. The general goal of this paper is to enrich the discussion by noting
alternative ways of understanding the project of reconciling quantum theory
with scientic realism. My more specic aim is to argue that a pragmatist view
of quantum theory facilitates just such a reconciliation.
I begin by building a framework in which to set alternative ways of un-
derstanding quantum realism. Besides helping to orient readers who havent
encountered them all, I use this to motivate the pragmatist realism described
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and defended in the bulk of the paper. Section 3 locates a novel form of physical
realism recently advocated by Chris Fuchs within this framework, at the same
time explaining why his QBist understanding of quantum theory is appropri-
ately regarded as anti-realist.
Then in section 4 I briey sketch key features of a pragmatist view of quan-
tum theory I have been developing recently. Scientic realism is often taken
to be a view or attitude toward how far, and how well, a scientic theory rep-
resents the world. But ultimately it is we, as users of theories, who represent
the world. In the case of quantum theory, we do so by applying mathematical
models to the world. This application involves claims about a target system
that are appropriately evaluated for truth and representational accuracy. But,
in this pragmatist view, quantum theory itself makes no claim of this form: and
scientic realism, broadly construed, does not require a theory to claim that
the target system is (more or less) faithfully represented by the model being
applied. Section 4 argues that this is not how models of quantum theory are
applied.
One symptom of the poverty of recent discussion of scientic realism (at least
in the quantum context) is the implicit assumption that any view of a scien-
tic theory is either (narrowly) realist or instrumentalist. In section 5 I review
reasons why the pragmatist view just sketched is not instrumentalist. In the
following sections of the paper I argue for a conception of scientic realism that
deems this pragmatist view realist. Realism about the quantum domain is often
taken to require provision of an ontological model. In section 6 I argue that
quantum theory does o¤er such a model in the pragmatist view, despite an un-
satisfying incompleteness that may motivate attempts to construct a successor
theory.
Section 7 argues that quantum theory o¤ers genuine explanations in the
pragmatist view. In section 8 I consider but reject the view that scientic
realism involves a thick notion of correspondence truth that is unavailable here.
Section 9 illustrates the limitations of correspondence truth using an inter-
esting recent argument that the universal applicability of quantum theory is in-
compatible with the assumption that each quantum measurement has a unique,
objective outcome. I defend this assumption by appeal to a pragmatist infer-
ential (rather than referential) account of the content of basic representational
claims that issue from an application of quantum theory. This account plays a
key role in the pragmatist view of section 4 by showing how to eliminate talk of
measurement from a precise statement of quantum theorys Born rule without
running afoul of "no-go" theorems that refute a naive realist interpretation of
quantum theory.
Some follow Putnam in viewing scientic realism as an empirical hypoth-
esis supported by the history of science. Section 10 o¤ers quantum theory as
evidence against this hypothesis, suggesting instead that improved symbolic
representation of the world be viewed as a long-term scientic aspiration. In
conclusion I review the form of quantum realism associated with the pragmatist
view of section 4, pointing out where it diverges from what others have taken
quantum realism to involve.
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2 What is Quantum Realism?
2.1 Realism
In approaching the varieties of quantum realism, Ill start with realism in gen-
eral:
(Realism) The world is the way it is (almost) no matter what anyone
may think about it: the only exceptions are processes involved in
thinking our thoughts.
A realist about the world of mathematics believes that numbers and their
properties exist independently of the existence or thoughts of mathematicians
or anyone else. Some mathematical realists take them to exist and have their
properties necessarily, so (for example)
5 + 7 = 12
would have been true even if there had been no thoughts and even no physical
world at all. But if the world contains thoughts, then at least some of its features
will depend on whatever is involved in thinking them hence the qualication.
Quantum realism is concerned with the physical world, not with the world
of mathematics. So this gives us
(Physical Realism) The physical world is the way it is (almost) no
matter what anyone may think; the only exceptions are physical
processes involved in thinking our thoughts.
Our thoughts a¤ect the physical world at least through the actions to which
they lead, and this is one way in which physical processes are involved in thinking
them (as when my thought of a drink prompts the raising of my glass). For a
physicalist this is not the only way, since he believes there is a sense in which
our thoughts are physical processes.
2.2 Scientic Realism
Physical Realism is a metaphysical thesis. But we ordinarily assume we learn
a lot about the world through science. This adds an epistemological, or at
least axiological, component to a scientic realism that incorporates Physical
Realism. According to Bas Van Fraassen [41], scientic realism is the view that
Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what
the world is like; and acceptance of a scientic theory involves the
belief that it is true. (p. 8)
Such a scientic realist (unlike van Fraassen himself!) takes science to be
guided by an epistemic aim that would be achieved only if scientists arrive
at literally true theories. Even if the world is ultimately physical, a science
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like psychology or sociology is not primarily concerned with its purely physical
aspects: but physics is. Applied to quantum theory, this kind of scientic realist
maintains that
Physics aims to give us, in quantum theory, a literally true story of
what the physical world is like; and acceptance of quantum theory
involves the belief that it is true.
In accordance with Physical Realism, such a literally true story would say
what the physical world is like: it would have nothing to say directly about
anyones thoughts or experiences of it. Quantum theory is undoubtedly very
successful: there are no empirical reasons to withhold acceptance. This leads to
one way of characterizing quantum realism:
(Quantum Scientic Realism0) Quantum theory gives us a literally
true story of what the physical world is like.
Scientic realists have a positive epistemic attitude toward the content of our
best theories, but the history of physical science cautions against overoptimism.
So contemporary scientic realists often restrict their epistemic commitment to
the approximate truth of our best theories, despite the obscurity of this notion of
approximate truth. Such caution suggests this alternative expression of realism
about quantum theory:
(Quantum Scientic Realism) Quantum theory purports to give us a
literally true story of what the physical world is like, and we should
believe that story is approximately true.
But what is that story? A would-be Quantum Scientic Realist must answer
the question "How could the world possibly be the way quantum theory says
it is?": she must provide an Interpretation of quantum theory.1 Notoriously,
this has turned out to be very di¢ cult. Easy answers have been shown to
be inadequate, and today the eld is littered with a proliferating variety of
competing Interpretations of quantum theory in various states of health.
2.3 Naive Realism
Many years ago [19] I formulated arguments against what I called Naive Re-
alism, which tells the following story. The quantum domain is supposed to be
determinate in that magnitudes always possess denite values on any quantum
system. It is held to be objective in that measurement is taken to be merely
our way of getting to know what some of these values are. The theory is prob-
abilistic, on this view, because in even the most favorable circumstances there
1 I capitalize the initial Ito distinguish attempts to answer this question within a broader
category of attempts to say how quantum theory should be understood. It is a substan-
tial representationalist assumption that the only way to understand quantum theory is to
understand how the world could be the way quantum theory says it is.
4
are magnitudes whose values on a given system at a given time are not deriv-
able from the appropriate quantum mechanical description of the system at that
time, while this description does yield probability distributions over sets of dis-
tinct values. This simple and inviting form of quantum mechanical realism may
be reasonably associated with the names of Popper[32] and Einstein[9]. It may
be dened by principles of Precise Values and Faithful Measurement:
(PV) For any quantum system s, and any dynamical variable A
pertaining to s, if t is a time lying within the lifetime of s, then A
has a unique real value on s at t.
(FM) If successful, a measurement of a dynamical variable A per-
taining to a quantum system s reveals the pre-existing value of A on
s.
The arguments were not wholly original: they were based on work by Kochen
and Specker [28] and by Bell [5]. The arguments rested on two implicit assump-
tions.
(Value Independence) The precise value of a dynamical variable is
independent of what variable or variables are to be measured.
(Fair Sampling) The probability of success is independent of the
value of the measured variable.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument [10] may be seen as an argument for
Naive Realism, based on their famous Reality Criterion:
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with cer-
tainty (i.e. with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical
quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality correspond-
ing to this physical quantity.
In recent discussions of so-called loophole-free tests of local realism ([26],
[17], [39]) the term realismis often equated to Naive Realism, with or without
some of these other assumptions.
The refutation of Naive Realism is not a deathblow to Quantum Scientic
Realism, since Naive Realism is an overly narrow understanding of realism about
quantum theory. Would-be scientic realists have implicitly recognized this by
investigating the prospects of alternative forms of Quantum Scientic Realism.
2.4 Wave Function Realism
One alternative has become known as wave function realism. The name is unfor-
tunate. A wave function  is a mathematical, not a physical, entity. (Einstein
preferred the more abstract term  -functionwhile Schrödinger used represen-
tative, in each case to highlight the objects status as a piece of mathematics.)
What a wave function realist is realist about is not this mathematical entity, but
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some physical entity she takes it to represent. Albert ([1], [2]) takes  to rep-
resent a physical eld in a multi-dimensional conguration space; an adherent
to the eigenstate-eigenvalue link might identify the physical referents of  with
the eigenvalue possessed by each variable represented by a self-adjoint operator
for which  is an eigenvector; a collapse theorist [16] might take  to represent
mass density, or alternatively ash-propensity [40]; and so on.
The volume entitled "The Wave Function" [3] o¤ers a sampling of recent
philosophical work in this tradition that reveals a proliferation of ways of devel-
oping, advocating, and criticizing it. As its subtitle reveals, the primary focus of
the volume is on metaphysical issues, especially the nature and dimensionality
of the space in which the wave function is dened. These are not issues with
which physicists are much concerned. As Wallace notes in his contribution to
[3], discussions of the metaphysics of wave function realism are often conducted
on the basis of assumptions that are hard to square with the way physicists un-
derstand currently fundamental forms of quantum theory. Of course there are
those who believe that current formulations of these theories are inadequate, so
that the term quantum theoryas it appears in the thesis of Quantum Scientic
Realism must be treated as open to negotiation in the interests of securing the
truth of the thesis.2 But to arrive at a charitable understanding of the quantum
theory we have it seems wise not to adopt a procrustean attitude to that theory
in order to t it to the Interpreters bed.
2.5 Spacetime State Realism
Contemporary formulations of quantum theory do not take the wave function
to be the only way to represent a systems quantum state. Even pure states are
typically represented by Hilbert space vectors or rays, while mixed states are
represented by density operators. In C*-algebraic formulations [38] states are
represented not in Hilbert space but by positive, normalized, linear functionals
on algebras of observables, and the pure/mixed distinction (di¤erently dened)
is supplemented by a further distinction, between normal states and non-normal
states that cannot be represented by density operators on a Hilbert space.
After raising objections to wave function realism, Wallace and Timpson [42]
instead advocate what they call spacetime state realism as a form of realism
about quantum states that better accords with physical practice. For a quantum
eld theory on a xed background spacetime, a quantum state is dened on
each open region of spacetime, including arbitrary unions of disjoint regions.
Ignoring non-normal states, the state of each region may be represented by a
density operator on a corresponding Hilbert space. For a quantum spacetime
state realist, to specify the state of every open region of spacetime in this way
is to give a complete fundamental physical description of world history.
It is not easy to recognize our familiar world in this description, and a pro-
ponent of spacetime state realism has his work cut out to convince critics that
2The work of Bell [5] has been particularly inuential in this regard: see the contribution
to [3] by Goldstein and Zanghì.
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it can be reconstructed from such spare and unfamiliar materials. Wallace and
Timpson propose to do this by appeal to decoherence within an Everettian
multiverse. But they acknowledge other possible routes, following alternative
Interpretational strategies based on hidden variables or dynamical-collapse the-
ories.
2.6 Should a realist about quantum theory be a Quantum
Scientic Realist?
This section briey explored a variety of proposed views of quantum theory,
each designed to answer the question "How could the world possibly be the way
quantum theory says it is?". They by no means exhaust the Interpretations
currently on o¤er, and we can condently expect new additions. Notoriously,
these Interpretations take quantum theory to o¤er mutually incompatible sto-
ries of what the physical world is like. For a constructive empiricist like van
Fraassen this presents a problem for physics only to the extent that di¤erent
Interpretations fail to be empirically equivalent. But the would-be scientic re-
alist cannot be so sanguine. If quantum theory cannot give us a single, literally
true story of what the physical world is like then Quantum Scientic Realism
cannot be true. To defend realism about quantum theory it seems that one
must develop an Interpretation and convince everyone of its superiority over
all others, largely if not completely without appeal to experiment. While the
arguments have improved over the years, so have the objections against every
proposed Interpretation. Perhaps we should think again about what it means
to be a realist about quantum theory?
3 Participatory Realism
By identifying realism about quantum theory with what I called Quantum Sci-
entic Realism we were led into the morass of rival Interpretations of quantum
theory. If we retrace the steps that led us there we arrive once more at what I
called
(Physical Realism) The physical world is the way it is (almost) no
matter what anyone may think; the only exceptions are physical
processes involved in realizing our thoughts.
Frustrated by attempts to label his QBist view of quantum theory instru-
mentalist or anti-realist, Chris Fuchs has recently classied his view as a form
of participatory realism, along with a number of other views of quantum theory.
These views have lately been termed participatory realismto em-
phasize that rather than relinquishing the idea of reality (as they
are often accused of), they are saying that reality is more than any
third-person perspective can capture. Thus, far from instances of in-
strumentalism or antirealism, these views of quantum theory should
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be regarded as attempts to make a deep statement about the nature
of reality. [15]
By inserting a rst-person perspective into the heart of physics, Fuchs por-
trays QBism as honoring Wheelers vision of a participatory universe in which
particlesand agents jointly create a universe whose external reality is mani-
fested by the unpredictable experiences that result from each agents interactions
with it.
I see participatory realism as a novel form of Physical Realism. While the
physicalist locates my thoughts as ultimately just elements of physical reality,
the participatory realist sets them apart in a way that resists inclusion within
any merely third-person perspective. So this is not just a novel form of dualism.
It is reminiscent of Putnams ([35], p. xi) (subsequently repudiated) internal
realist metaphor
The mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world.
Taken literally, Fuchss participatory realism is no metaphor, but the rad-
ical metaphysical thesis that reality admits of no third-person view neither
materialist, idealist, nor dualist. As he puts it,
these views of quantum theory should be regarded as attempts to
make a deep statement about the nature of reality.
But need a quantum realist accept this, or any similar, metaphysical thesis?
Science-based arguments for metaphysical conclusions are notoriously contro-
versial, and in this case so are the arguments for QBism or other participatory-
realist views of quantum theory.3 By retreating so far from the morass of
Interpretations our would-be quantum realist has backed himself into a dark
metaphysical corner!
Moreover, a QBist who endorses this novel form of Physical Realism has
totally repudiated the Quantum Scientic Realist demand that quantum theory
tell us what the physical world is like. For a QBist, rather than describing the
physical world, quantum theory is merely a tool each individual may take up
and use to better anticipate that individuals experiences when acting in the
physical world. Even after abandoning Quantum Scientic Realism, a scientic
realist should expect the practice of quantum physics to yield more substantive
information about an independently existing physical world. Surely theres a
better way to be a quantum realist?
4 Representation and a Pragmatist Alternative
Van Fraassens formulation of scientic realism arose in the course of his at-
tempt to avoid metaphysics in an account of scientic practice as directed to-
ward epistemological goals. He went on to propose constructive empiricism as a
3My [25] provides an introduction to the controversy, including references to relevant lit-
erature.
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less metaphysically-loaded alternative. Recall the way he formulated scientic
realism:
Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what
the world is like; and acceptance of a scientic theory involves the
belief that it is true.
He inserted the word literallyto disqualify positivist and other non-literal
accounts of theoretical truth. Van Fraassen endorsed the so-called semantic
conception of a scientic theory as dened by a class of models, and identied
the truth of a theory with the truth of the statement that the world is faithfully
represented by some model in this class.
Quantum theory in its various forms is naturally understood to involve a
family of mathematical models, some non-relativistic, others relativistic; some
used to model systems of particles, others to model systems of elds; etc. Fol-
lowing Van Fraassens lead, one could then say that, for a scientic realist, to
accept quantum theory is to believe that it is literally true that some model
in this family faithfully represents the world. But to say that is to commit once
more to the perilous Interpretative quest pursued by the Quantum Scientic
Realist.
Here is where pragmatism can o¤er the would-be quantum realist a better
way, by querying the representationalist assumption that a scientic theory
can give us a literally true story of what the world is like only by faithfully
representing the world. At rst sight the realist may see no alternative to this
assumption. But an alternative will emerge once we focus on how mathematical
models of quantum theory are applied to the world. The key is to see how, in
application, a model can guide us toward a literally true story without itself
telling it.
I begin with some seemingly pedantic remarks. It is scientists, not science,
who create theories even while pursuing scientic aims. And representation is
something scientists and other people do with a model, not something the model
does by itself. In pursuit of the aims of science, scientists do many things with
the theories they create. They apply theoretical models to the world in various
ways, including using a model to represent the world or, more typically, a system
of interest in the world. Even in a representational application, the model is
almost never claimed to o¤er a faithful representation of the target system, but
only to represent it well enough for the purposes at hand. So claims based on
application of a theory are almost never given to us by, or in, that theory.
It is distinctive of quantum theory that, when applied to a target system, its
models are not applied to represent that system. As I see it, the role of the wave
function (or other mathematical representative of a quantum state, a phrase
I shall not repeat) is not to describe or represent some physical magnitude,
entity or law but to provide good advice to any user of quantum theory about
the signicance and credibility of magnitude claims about physical systems.
This is how a quantum model guides us toward the literal truth of some such
claims when the model is applied. Certainly a target system is assigned a
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quantum state, but the primary role of that state is not to represent the system
or its properties: it is to permit application of the Born rule to determine what
probabilities to assign to various eventualities involving this and similar systems.
I call this the states primary role because that is the main use of quan-
tum states in physical practice. Physicists usually say that the resulting Born
probabilities concern possible measurement outcomes: the demise of naive re-
alism shows they cannot be uniformly understood as probabilities of possessed
properties.
But we can and should avoid any talk of measurement by using quantum
models of decoherence when determining which properties may be meaningfully
ascribed to a system in an application of the Born rule. Ascription of a property
to system s is through a magnitude claim of the form s has Q 2 , where Q
is a magnitude such as energy, or a component of position, momentum or spin,
and  is a Borel set of real numbers. Models of decoherence may be applied to
show that Naive Realisms (PV) is false because there is no physical situation
in which, for every such property Q 2 , s may be meaningfully said either to
possess, or to lack, that property.
In this way a quantum model can play an important preliminary role by ad-
vising a user on how signicant is each magnitude claim about a physical system
in a particular situation. To assess its signicance, the user may apply (unitary)
quantum theory to that system in interaction with its environment. In a quan-
tum model of a system and its environment, an initial wave function assigned
just to the system would typically evolve extraordinarily rapidly and robustly
into a (reduced state) density operator that is extremely close to diagonal in
some pointer basisdetermined by the nature of the interaction Hamiltonian.4
Only claims concerning each magnitude represented by an operator near-
diagonal in the pointer basis are thereby selected as having enough content to
be assigned a Born probability, resulting in signicant sets of mutually exclusive
and jointly exhaustive magnitude claims suitable for application of the Born
rule. Anyone who accepts quantum theory should set credence (only) in each
signicant magnitude claim equal to its Born probability, condent that exactly
one claim in the set for each such magnitude is true while the others are false.
No magnitude claim that lacks signicance in that environmental context is
worthy of credence such meaningless claims cannot even be entertained.
It is on signicant magnitude claims that a quantum realist can base a
literally true story of what part of the world involving the target system is like,
though which story is true will depend on which eventualities actually come
to pass. Quantum theory does not tell that story. But we can use quantum
theory to reassure ourselves that there is some true story to be told, in terms
of true signicant magnitude claims and other statements whose truth these
claims determine, such as Bells ([5], p. 52) settings of switches and knobs on
experimental equipment, the currents in coils, and the readings of instruments.
And we can use quantum theory as a source of good advice on what to expect
the true story to be.
4For further details, see my [21].
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The reader will have noticed a certain "fuzziness" in my statement of the
pragmatic rules governing the use of the wave function. This is as unproblematic
as it is inevitable. Bell [4] began his Against measurementwith the complaint
that surely by now we should have an exact formulation of some serious part of
quantum mechanics. This may be achieved simply by dropping von Neumanns
notorious projection postulate(collapse of the wave function on measurement)
and removing any reference to measurement, observation, apparatus, classical
system, etc. from a statement of the Born rule in the way I have indicated.
Pragmatic rules governing the use of the wave function should not appear in
the resulting exact formulation: They concern the application of the theory so
formulated. No matter how exactly or precisely a scientic theory is formulated,
its application always requires skill and judgment that cannot be made fully
explicit. Any pragmatic rule guiding that application remains subject to inter-
pretation by the skilled practitioner. A good physicist is able to judge when it is
permissible to apply the Born rule even without deploying a model of environ-
mental decoherence fortunately, because environments are typically complex
open systems for which there are few tractable quantum models of decoher-
ence, and even in these few, completely robust and irreversible diagonalization
of system density operator is never more than a very good approximation.
5 Is this Instrumentalism?
There are realists who will dismiss the pragmatist view briey introduced in
the previous section (and developed further in my [20], [24]) as an unacceptably
instrumentalist view of quantum theory. Before going on to argue that this
pragmatist view o¤ers a novel form of quantum realism, Ill rst respond to this
charge of instrumentalism.
According to current usage, instrumentalism in the philosophy of science
is the view that a theory is merely a tool for systematizing and predicting
our observations: For the instrumentalist, nothing a theory supposedly says
about unobservable structures lying behind but responsible for our observations
should be considered signicant. Moreover, instrumentalists characteristically
explain this alleged lack of signicance in semantic or epistemic terms: claims
about unobservables are meaningless, reducible to statements about observables,
eliminable from a theory without loss of content, false, or (at best) epistemically
optional even for one who accepts the theory.
But the pragmatist view sketched in the previous section makes no use of
any distinction between observable and unobservable structures, so to call it
instrumentalist conicts with current usage. In this pragmatist view, quantum
theory does not posit novel, unobservable structures corresponding to quantum
states, operators and Born probabilities: these are not beables represented in
quantum models. Nevertheless, claims about them in quantum theory are often
perfectly signicant, and many are true. This pragmatist view does not seek
to undercut the semantic or epistemic status of such claims, but to enrich our
understanding of their non-representational function within the theory and to
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show how they acquire the content they have.
As we saw in §2.4, wave function realists take the wave function to represent
a novel physical structurethe quantum statewhose existence is evidenced by
the theorys success. In this view, a wave function represents a physical structure
that either exists independently of the more familiar physical systems to which
magnitude claims pertain or else grounds their existence and properties. From
this realist perspective, it may seem natural to label as instrumentalist any
approach opposed to that account of the quantum state.
But a pragmatist should concede the reality of the quantum state its ex-
istence follows trivially from the truth of quantum claims ascribing quantum
states to systems. What he should deny is that a quantum state assignment
is true independently of or prior to the true magnitude claims that (in his
view) provide the backing for it. Note that any such state assignment is re-
lational, since these are the claims about values of magnitudes accessible from
the physical situation of an actual or hypothetical agent that would make this
the correct quantum state to assign, relative to that situation. But although
they are relational, quantum state assignments are perfectly objective, since
this agent-situation is physical and not merely epistemic. (Relational) quantum
states could exist even in a world without agents, as long as that world contained
physical situations that some agent might have occupied. Under a reasonably
expansive conception of agency that will include most or all spatiotemporal
worlds.
The truth of a quantum state assignment trivially implies that a wave func-
tion represents something we call a quantum state. It does not imply that this
quantum state is a beable of quantum theory a purported element of physical
reality that it is the job of the wave function in a quantum model to represent.
The previous section described the non-representational roles a wave function
plays when a quantum model is applied. In its primary role the wave function
o¤ers advice on how strongly to believe magnitude claims. But when a model
of quantum theory is applied it is the function of magnitude claims to repre-
sent elements of physical reality. These are the claims that underlie statements
about the outcomes of quantum measurements, and they play a crucial role in
representing what quantum theory is used to predict and explain.
A radical pragmatist might deny that representing reality is ever the pri-
mary function of any claim. Such a radical pragmatist could reject the rep-
resentationalist presupposition of this realist/instrumentalist dilemma the as-
sumption that mere representation could be a (key) function of an element of
theoretical structure that gures centrally in an account of its content. The
pragmatist view of quantum theory briey sketched in §4 does not require this
denial or rejection. But as well see in §9, acceptance of this view of quan-
tum theory does require re-examination of what it is for a magnitude claim to
represent physical reality.
Not only does quantum theory inform us about the unobserved: it helps
agents improve their beliefs about microscopic phenomena that are often con-
sidered unobservable. Many magnitude claims are about properties of systems
that are unobservable by unaided human senses. This is to be expected, since
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quantum theory was initially developed as a theory of the microworld, where
classical physics was rst seen to break down. For the pragmatist, unlike the con-
structive empiricist or traditional instrumentalist, the observable/unobservable
distinction is of no special semantic, epistemic or methodological signicance.
The use of quantum theory to adjust credences in magnitude claims about mi-
croscopic phenomena is not only compatible with the present pragmatist view,
but plays an important role in helping us explain regularities they exhibit (see
§7).
Some may concede that the present pragmatist view of quantum theory
is not instrumentalist in the classical sense because it abjures any observ-
able/unobservable distinction. But they may wish to count it as instrumentalist
in a more general sense, because it relies on a parallel distinction between quan-
tum and classical, or between quantum states and the magnitudes about whose
values these are taken to o¤er advice.
Certainly, in this pragmatist view, quantum theory itself distinguishes be-
tween these magnitudes and quantum states. But the distinction is functional,
not epistemic or semantic: and it does not rely on any problematic notion of
classicality. The progress of physics has revealed magnitudes unknown to clas-
sical physics such as strangeness and (the value of) the Higgs eld. Quantum
states may o¤er advice on these magnitudes as well as classical magnitudes such
as position and momentum. In an application of a model of quantum eld the-
ory, a quantum state can also o¤er advice on the circumstances in which it is
legitimate to make claims about entities, such as Higgs particles or the Higgs
eld as well as photons and the (classical) electromagnetic eld. But quantum
states are themselves neither magnitudes nor entities, even when they are real
(as follows from the truth of the corresponding quantum state assignments).
Here is how quantum theory relates to the physical world, in the present
pragmatist view. In accordance with Physical Realism, the physical world ex-
ists and has its properties (almost) independently of the existence, thoughts or
activities of human or other agents situated within it. Because of their phys-
ical situation, agents like us lack a great deal of information about the world,
and especially about how it will develop in our future. By creating physical
theories we have been able to improve our imperfect epistemic situation. A
theory in classical physics was characteristically applied in claims to the e¤ect
that mathematical structures in its models represented physical structures in
the world (well enough for the purposes at hand). In this way, the theory was
itself taken to represent the world, as containing entities with particular values
of physical magnitudes. But an application of a model of quantum theory works
di¤erently. The goal is still improved beliefs about the values of physical mag-
nitudes on physical entities, but the theory itself does not represent magnitudes
as having values. Instead, it o¤ers advice on which entities can meaningfully be
assigned values for particular magnitudes, and what credence should be assigned
to possession of di¤erent possible values for those magnitudes.
The wave function in a quantum model plays its primary role in issuing
this advice by serving as input to the Born rule when the model is legitimately
applied. The resulting advice is good just when the correct wave function is
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assigned, in which case the wave function represents the real quantum state
of the system to which it is assigned. But correctly representing the quantum
state of the system is incidental to the purpose of providing good advice to
physically, and so epistemically, limited agents on the values of magnitudes on
physical entities. To put it metaphorically, quantum states, though real, would
be of no particular interest to an omniscient God with direct epistemic access
to the values of all magnitudes on all physical entities throughout world history.
6 No Ontological Model?
Even if the arguments of the last section convinced you that the pragmatist
view briey sketched in §4 is not instrumentalist, you may be unwilling to
call it realist. In recent foundational discussions, realism has been cast in the
framework of ontological models. Here is an example from one recent paper.
(Single-world) Realism: The system has some physical properties,
a specication of which is called its ontic state, denoted . Ontic
states take values in a (measurable) set called the ontic state space.
([30], p.6)
In non-Everettian versions of wave function realism, a systems ontic state is
specied by its wave function  . In the more general ontological models frame-
work  may or may not include  , but it may include hidden variables (as
Bohmian mechanics includes position variables). The motivating thought here
is that a realist must be able to tell a story about what is going on in the world
in situations where quantum theory makes correct predictions, even though no
such story emerges from quantum theory itself (as usually understood).
For one who takes the pragmatist view of §4, there is a meaningful story
to be told about the values of various magnitudes in circumstances when the
content of claims about them is well enough dened. But these magnitudes are
not always well dened, and so there is no ontic state space in which even one of
them always has a precise value. So this view permits only a gappystory of
what is going on in the world that does not conform to (Single world) Realism.
For example, when Bell inequalities are violated in photon experiments there
is nothing signicant one can say about the polarization properties of each
entangled photon prior to detection.
But how reasonable is it to impose (Single-world) Realism as a condition
on anything that could count as quantum realism? A gappy story is still
a story about what the physical world is like, independent of the existence or
activities of agents or observers. Accepting this view of quantum theory does
not commit one to the belief that the world is mind-dependent in any way that
would conict with Physical Realism.
The story provided by Newtons theory was not rejected as anti-realist de-
spite the fact that it included no mechanism lling the gaps between the sun and
the earth on which it exerted a gravitational attraction. Admittedly, its succes-
sor (Einsteins theory of general relativity) gave a more complete story with its
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dynamic spacetime permitting continuous propagation of (now conrmed) grav-
itational waves. A realist may hold out the hope of a similar completion of the
gappyquantum story, perhaps involving a kind of retrocausation that would
undermine the independence condition required to rule out Naive Realism.[33]
7 Is this Pragmatist view Explanatory?
For a realist, the demand for an ontological model is closely associated with
the need to provide genuine understanding. Bell, for example, maintained that
only if reformulated precisely in terms of a clear ontology of beables could
quantum theory supply the kind of explanations we need to understand the big
world outside the laboratory. How genuine is the understanding provided by a
gappystory that is all quantum theory permits on the pragmatist view?
As I have argued elsewhere ([20], [22], [24]), in this pragmatist view quantum
theory helps us to explain a host of otherwise puzzling phenomena by showing
that they were to be expected and what they depend on. The primary target of
explanation is not individual events but what I call probabilistic phenomena. A
probabilistic phenomenon is a probabilistic data model of a statistical regularity.
To explain a probabilistic phenomenon using quantum theory one locates it
within a general class of similar phenomena and shows how the probability
distributions in each case are a consequence of a similar legitimate application
of the Born rule to a quantum state that is correctly assigned to the systems
concerned. This unies all phenomena in this class by providing something
close to what Railton [37] called a deductive-nomological probabilistic (DNP)
explanation of each phenomenon.
Here are my reasons for the qualication. Unlike Railton, I consider the
primary explanandum in each case to be not an individual chance event but the
probabilistic phenomenon such events manifest. For Railton, a DNP explanation
of an individual event must allude to a (probabilistic) causal mechanism that
gives rise to that event. But while use of quantum theory to explain a probabilis-
tic phenomenon must display an appropriate dependence of events manifesting
it, the form of that dependence need not be causal; and even when it is, the
term mechanismdoes not seem apt. Here are two examples to illustrate each
point.
That individual hydrogen atoms are stable against spontaneous collapse is
a (probability 1) example of a probabilistic phenomenon. We can use quantum
theory to explain this phenomenon by showing that the expectation value of a
hydrogen atoms energy has a nite lower bound, so the probability is zero for it
to have the arbitrarily large negative energy associated with collapse. No causal
mechanism is appealed to in the explanation. That hydrogen atoms manifest
this phenomenon (by not collapsing) does not depend on a causal mechanism
that produces it but on their constitution: each is constituted by an electron
and a proton interacting through an electromagnetic potential.
A violation of a Bell inequality is a probabilistic phenomenon. We can use
quantum theory to explain this phenomenon by deriving the relevant proba-
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bility distributions from the Born rule, legitimately applied to the appropriate
polarization-entangled state of photon pairs whose detection manifests the phe-
nomenon. The events of polarization detection in an individual pair depend
causally on whatever events (described by magnitude claims about preparation
devices) back the assignment of that entangled state, since interventions on those
devices would alter their probabilities. But the distant events of polarization-
detection in each instance are causally independent. Moreover, quantum theory
has nothing to say about any continuous causal process mediating the causal
dependence of an individual detection event on its backing conditions, and Bells
theorem shows that these events can be produced by no causal mechanism of a
kind we have previously encountered.
Some realists may not be satised by such explanations on the grounds that
they yield only partial understanding. But this is not su¢ cient reason to reject
the view of quantum theory that lay behind them as not realist. In this pragma-
tist view, quantum theory helps us explain these phenomena by appeal to what
is going on in the physical world with no reference to observers, agents or minds.
A realist who hankers after more may be compared to Newton, who remained
dissatised with explanations using his own theory of universal gravitation and
continued to search fruitlessly for "the cause of gravity". Over 200 years passed
before Einsteins general relativity permitted the reconceptualization that since
gravity is not a force it needs no cause. Dissatisfaction with the good expla-
nations quantum theory helps us to give is not a reason to reject the pragmatist
view of quantum theory, though it may motivate the search for a theory that
can help us give more satisfying explanations.
8 Truth
In this pragmatist view, quantum theory helps us describe the physical world
by means of magnitude claims, on whose signicance and credibility it o¤ers us
advice. These are what we use to make statements about physical reality when
applying a quantum model, and their truth or falsity is what we ultimately care
about. Realism is often associated with a correspondence theory of truth, so it
is important to address the objection that the way the pragmatist view treats
magnitude claims is incompatible with correspondence truth and therefore also
quantum realism.
Recall that, in this view, the signicance of a magnitude claim about
a system depends on the systems environment. Consider the claim C: s has
Q 2 . This attributes property Q 2  to s. As Tarski insisted, C is true if
and only if s has Q 2 , and that will be so just in case s refers to s and
s satises Q 2 . The pragmatist readily assents to this Tarskian demand,
and if that is all that correspondence truth comes to then correspondence truth
is part of this pragmatist view. But some scientic realists demand more of
correspondence truth. Field [11] further demanded a physicalist reduction of
reference relations, and even self-avowed pragmatist Philip Kitcher once argued
that
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Reference relations are causal relations between mind-independent
entities and linguistic tokens. ([27], p.347)
However, there seem to be cases in which linguistic tokens succeed in refer-
ring to mind-independent entities incapable of bearing causal relations, as when
I use the word one or the numeral 1 to refer to the number 1. Of course
nominalists deny the existence of numbers and other non-physical entities. But
one who adopts this pragmatist view of quantum theory is already committed
to the reality of quantum states and Born probabilities to which we succeed in
referring even though these dont enter into causal relations.
I agree with Stephen Leeds [29] that a quantum realist can and should reject a
thicknotion of correspondence truth that requires reference to be understood
as a causal relation in favor of a more minimal account of truth and reference.
This is not the place to survey the several deationary options currently on
o¤er. I merely insist that whatever version of minimalism is adopted should
be accompanied by an account of the wider function of attributions of truth
and reference capable of explaining the importance of these concepts in our
discourse. This seems especially important in an era of alternative facts!
In quantum theory, claims about quantum states and Born probabilities
guide belief about the magnitude claims that are basic to the theorys use in
predicting, explaining and controlling phenomena. From this perspective it is
natural to think that terms appearing in magnitude claims refer to their subject
matter in a way that is somehow more immediate or concrete than terms like
probabilityor wave function. But I think it would be a mistake for a realist to
be misled by this thought into adopting a causal account of how reference works
in the case of magnitude claims. Indeed, in the next section I will show how a
recent argument undermines any such thicknotion of correspondence even for
claims about the outcomes of quantum measurements whose truth some true
magnitude claims determine.
9 The Limits of Quantum Objectivity
Realists may disagree about whether wave functions represent something phys-
ically real, whether electrons have precise positions and momenta, and whether
the world is non-local. But on one point all (except Everettians) agree: quantum
measurements each have a unique, physically real outcome and their statistics
are correctly predicted by quantum theory. A recent argument by Frauchiger
and Renner [13] seeks to show that this assumption is inconsistent with the
universal applicability of quantum theory itself. The original argument is too
long to repeat here, so instead I shall sketch a simpler version I rst heard in a
talk by Matthew Pusey.
Consider the following (completely unrealizable!) thought-experiment. Sup-
pose that Alice and Bob decide to conduct measurements of various polarization
components on a large number of pairs of photons, where each pair is correctly
assigned the same polarization-entangled state. Being lazy, they do not at rst
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perform any measurements themselves, but delegate that task to their friends,
Carol and Dan respectively, each of whom performs the required measurements
in his or her otherwise completely physically isolated laboratory. For each pair
of photons, Carol measures polarization of one photon with respect to axis c
while Dan measures polarization of the other photon with respect to axis d. By
assumption, each of their measurements has a unique, physically real outcome
(as registered in their notebooks or stored in their computers): and quantum
theory correctly predicts the correlations between these outcomes from the joint
probability distribution P (c; d) calculated by application of the Born rule to the
entangled state assigned to the pairs (where c, d are random variables whose
values indicate the outcome of the respective polarization measurement).
After each photon pair is measured by Carol and Bob, instead of asking
them what outcomes they observed, Alice and Bob apply very carefully tailored
interactions to the entire contents C, D of their respective laboratories (includ-
ing Carol and Dan themselves). They do this repeatedly, for each photon pair
independently. Quantum theory then predicts the e¤ect of these interactions is
to restore each photon pair to its original entangled state and to restore each
lab+occupant C, D to its state prior to the polarization measurement, thus
permitting Carol and Bob to continue their measurements. Finally, Alice mea-
sures polarization of one photon in each pair with respect to axis a while Bob
measures polarization of the other photon with respect to axis b.
By assumption, each of Alices and Bobs measurements also has a unique,
physically real outcome (as registered in their notebooks or stored in their com-
puters): and quantum theory correctly predicts the correlations between these
outcomes from the joint probability distribution P (a; b) calculated by applica-
tion of the Born rule to the same entangled state assigned to the pairs. Given our
working assumption, quantum theory also correctly predicts the correlations be-
tween Carols outcomes and Bobs from the probability distribution P (b; c), and
between Alices outcomes and Dans from the probability distribution P (a; d),
each of which may again be calculated by applying the Born rule to the same
entangled state assigned to the pairs.
If the entangled photon state and the axes a; b; c; d are chosen appropri-
ately, the probabilistic correlations predicted in this way by quantum theory
will violate a Bell inequality (the so-called CHSH inequality). But since they
constitute a joint distribution over all four measured variables the statistics of
these assumed real outcomes will always conform to the inequality. We have a
contradiction. So the assumption is false: quantum measurements do not always
have unique, physically real outcomes whose statistics are correctly predicted
by quantum theory. But predictions of quantum theory have always been con-
rmed by the statistics of measurement outcomes. So we cannot assume that
these measurement outcomes are uniquely physically real!
For one who adopts the pragmatist view of §4, a quantum measurement has a
unique, physical outcome. A statement about that outcome has a determinate,
mind-independent truth-value: its truth hinges on that of magnitude claims
about physical systems involved in the measuring apparatus. This pragmatist
view not only escapes refutation in the imagined scenario, but also receives sup-
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port from its deeper analysis. The key point is that, in this view, acceptance
of quantum theory modies the content of a statement about the outcome of
a quantum measurement by restricting what inferences may legitimately made
from its truth. The restriction e¤ectively relativizes that content to the environ-
mental context of the system to which quantum theory may be applied. That
content then becomes a function of the physical environment within which the
system is located. The way content depends on physical environment may be
modeled by a quantum model of decoherence.
In all practicably realizable circumstances the environmental context is ap-
propriately modeled by massive decoherence of the relevant quantum state, so
that all physically situated agents (not only human agents like Alice, Bob and
friends) are able to neglect the fact that content may depend on environmental
context and successfully attribute a context-independent content to a statement
about any measurement outcome. But in the (completely practicably unreal-
izable) circumstances described in the thought-experiment this is not so, since
Alice, Bob and friends do not share a single environmental context. In these
circumstances it is investigatorslabs that provide the relevant environmental
context. Here context-relativity can be indicated by an appropriate subscript.
For example, the content of a magnitude claim M reporting the outcome of
one of Carols measurements on a system in her lab C may be represented as
[M ]C . In their situation they (and we) may continue to agree that there are true
statements about their unique physical measurement outcomes with objective,
mind-independent content. But that content is not context-independent since
it does not license reliable inferences between di¤erent environmental contexts.
Decoherence conned to each of their individual laboratories models the
environmental context underlying the content of each claim about the outcome
of a measurement in that lab. For Carol and Dan physically to have exchanged
information they would have had to physically combine their environmental
contexts to form a unied context C [ D into which their statements about
their outcomes could have been reliably exported. Alternatively, either Carol
or Dan might have physically exchanged information with Alice or Bob without
rst exchanging information with each other, permitting each reliably to export
statements about his or her outcomes into that incompatible larger context. But
in fact no such physical interactions occurred in the imagined scenario, in which
the environments C, D remained sealed o¤ from each other and also from the
environments A, B of Alice and Bob. The upshot is that while the content of
each statement about the unique outcome of every measurement on each of an
entangled pair of photons may be treated here as perfectly well dened within
an environmental context, there is no such context in which a statement about
all these outcomes has well dened content.
When Alice and Bob combine their results in their physically unied joint
environment A [ B, statements of the outcomes a; b modeled by the joint dis-
tribution P (a; b) are signicant in A [ B, and the Born rule may legitimately
be applied to (correctly) predict this joint distribution. But the absence of the
required unied contexts renders illegitimate any application of the Born rule
to predict the joint probabilities P (c; d), P (b; c), P (a; d) that also appear in a
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statement of the CHSH inequality. Indeed, by applying quantum theory in this
scenario we can see that the CHSH inequality cannot be derived here since there
is no environmental context in which its constituent probabilities are all well de-
ned. So statements of the unique, contextually well-dened, physical outcomes
of all quantum measurements in the imagined scenario violate no legitimately
derivable Bell inequality.
There is a common philosophical view of how content depends on context
that may appear to be in tension with the idea that content can depend on con-
text in this way. In this view, a statement has signicant content if and only if it
expresses a determinate proposition. While what content a statement expresses
may depend on the context to which it relates (loosely, to the context in which
it is made), context merely determines what proposition a claim expresses. Any
variation of content with context can be represented by a function from context
into proposition expressed.
In this view, an adequate analysis of a statements content must then supply
an account of the content of each proposition in the range of that function
in a referential semantics that provides its truth conditions: if the function is
only partial, the claim has no content in a context in which it expresses no
determinate proposition. So an adequate analysis of the content of a statement
S reporting the outcome of a measurement will either assign it some specic
content (varying from context to context) or no content at all (in other contexts).
It follows that no analysis is adequate according to which what varies with
context is not simply the specic content of the statement but also how much
content it has.
This philosophical view provides an idealized model of content that is helpful
in elucidating the meaning of indexicals like Iand now, for which the context
in which a statement is made seems readily speciable (by saying who made it
and when). It becomes problematic in circumstances where contextual elements
are harder to pin down. As an example, consider the statementK, when uttered
on a road trip across Kansas
K: Kansas is atter than a pancake.
What determinate proposition does this express? K may be taken literally
or as a metaphor for the literal claim
V : Kansas is very at.
Taking it literally, intrepid researchers [12] compared a geographic prole
of the state based on a digital elevation model provided by the United States
Geographic Survey to the prole of a particular pancake from the International
House of Pancakes using a confocal laser microscope. They chose as a measure
of atness the deviation from sphericity of an ellipsoid, and estimated this in
each case from a best t to two chosen orthogonal transects of the surface. On
this measure, Kansas proved to be much atter than the pancake: the authors
concluded that:
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The calculated atness of the pancake transect from the digital im-
age is approximately 0.957, which is pretty at, but far from per-
fectly at. Kansass atness is approximately 0.9997. That degree
of atness might be described, mathematically, as damn at.
The latter claim presumably establishes the truth of V . But on an alterna-
tive, qualitative local measure of atness the authors commented that
When viewed at a scale of 50 mm, a pancake appears more rugged
than the Grand Canyon.
One might quibble that Kansas cannot be at since its elevation varies from
4039 feet to 679 feet above sea level, or that (as noted in one YouTube video
taken from a speeding car) you can see the curvature of the earth. You see the
problem: When uttered on a road trip across Kansas, the context fails to pick
out any well dened proposition expressed by statement K, even though that
statement clearly conveys something that is both signicant and true.
It may be tempting to dismiss such di¢ culties in specifying the context of
utterance for claims like K and V as arising from their vague or metaphorical
language. But on closer examination the same kind of problems a­ ict even
the paradigm case of the indexical now. For what exactly is it to specify the
time at which a statement is uttered? Any actual utterance is not an event
but a process extending over an interval of time. But even precisely to specify
an instant within this process either (falsely) presupposes a universal absolute
time or (assuming relativity theory) requires a further specication of a state
of motion associated with a local inertial frame and/or a spacelike hypersurface
including some point-event in the utterers vicinity.
One committed to a propositional model of content might acknowledge the
resulting indeterminacy in exactly what proposition is expressed by utterance of
a sentence including the indexical now, while maintaining that essentially the
same content is conveyed by the utterance for every admissible way of resolving
this indeterminacy. But that would commit her both to a non-propositional no-
tion of content and to the task of explaining why the contingent circumstances of
human communication render this propositional indeterminacy harmless. Such
contingencies have been explored by both philosophers and physicists.
Buttereld [8] notes the importance of several physical features of the en-
vironment in which we generally communicate, including the proximity of the
parties and the slow rate at which the timely topics of their communication
change, compared to the speed of their communication. By considering rel-
ativistic physics, Hartle [18] and Penrose [31] (pp. 3923) note the further
importance of the slow relative speed of communicators. Any attempt precisely
to specify what proposition is expressed by utterance of a sentence including a
temporal indexical like nowwould require careful application of physical the-
ories to the environment of utterance. But an account of its content does not
require this. Even a qualitative analysis generally su¢ ces to explain how such
a tensed utterance is able to convey content that is su¢ ciently well dened for
practical human purposes.
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Returning to the imagined scenario of the thought-experiment, what propo-
sition is picked out by Alices statement that the outcome of the 100th of her
measurements was a detection of a photon horizontally polarized with respect to
axis a? In the pragmatist view of §4, the truth value of this statement in context
is determined by that of some magnitude claim of the form M : s has Q 2 .
One can give an account of the truth conditions of a claim of the formM : s has
Q 2  but this is trivial. For example: M is true if and only if the system to
which srefers has a value for the magnitude to which Qrefers that lies in the
set of real numbers to which refers. Once the (tensed) claim is somehow(!)
indexed to a time, these truth conditions are independent of context, since the
claim contains no explicit indexical elements.
The problem with this referential approach is not that it is wrong but that,
once one has despaired of a physicalist or causal account of reference, it is too
shallow to be helpful. The approach fails to illuminate the di¤erent ways a claim
of the formM functions when s is in di¤erent environments. The claim functions
within a web of inferences, and the extent of its content depends on the context
provided by the presence of other claims in the web here, an assumption about
ss quantum state is required in assessing the content of a claim of the form M
about s, since assignment of a (reduced) quantum state reects the extent and
nature of environmental decoherence in a quantum model of Alices environment
A.
The referential approach to content sometimes provides a useful analytic
model of content, but it lacks the resources to account for how content accrues
to a statement. To understand quantum theory one needs to adopt a better
account of what gives a statement content. By modifying inferential relations
involving magnitude claims quantum theory a¤ects their content, rendering this
contextual. Philosophers customarily regard a claim as meaningful if and only if
it expresses a denite proposition when made in an adequately specied context:
otherwise it is taken to be meaningless. An improved pragmatist inferentialist
approach to the content of an empirical claim (Brandom [6], [7]) accepts a role
for context but replaces this digital view of content with an analogview.
Content accrues by degrees as links are added to the inferential web within which
statements are located. By making the content of a magnitude claim about a
system a function of the environment, acceptance of quantum theory cautions
one against taking that claim to attribute an intrinsic property to an object
independently of environmental context, even while insisting on the objective
content of the claim.
It is only because the situation of agents like us in the physical world is
such that we will always inevitably share a single "decoherence environment"
that we are able to ignore the implicit dependence on our physical situation of
the contents, not only of statements about the outcomes of quantum measure-
ments, but of practically all claims about macroscopic, and most claims about
microscopic, systems.
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10 Scientic Realism as an Empirical Thesis
Hilary Putnam ([34], [36]) viewed scientic realism as an empirical hypothesis
that we should accept as the best, if not the only, explanation of the success
of science. He endorsed a formulation of Richard Boyd as inuencing his con-
ception of scientic realism that terms in a mature science typically refer, and
theories accepted in a mature science are typically approximately true. His fa-
mous "no miracle" argument took the success of science and the preservation
of terms like electronthrough scientic theory change as evidence for scientic
realism, so conceived. The realist explanation of these features of science (suc-
cess and reference preservation) is that scientists mirror the world in the sense
of constructing symbolic representations of their environment and that sci-
ence succeeds in the way it does because these symbolic representations become
increasingly accurate as science progresses.
Faced with potential counterexamples from the history of science, this em-
pirical hypothesis has been claried or modied in two ways. Some have sought
to distinguish terms for a theorys working posits, whose successful reference is
supported by its success, from other non-referring terms. Supporters of struc-
tural scientic realism have taken refuge from apparent counterexamples in an
appeal to theoretical preservation of representations of structure, rather than
(the nature of) objects, with the progress of science. A recent paper by Steven
French [14] adopts this perspective toward quantum theory.
Which features of a scientic theory should a scientic realist take
to represent the world? Answer: those features that are responsible
for the theorys explanatory successes. When the theory is quantum
mechanics, the wave function is surely one of those features. ([3], p.
76)
But, in the present pragmatist view, what is distinctive about the success of
quantum theory is precisely that it is not due to introduction of new symbols (for
beables) to represent novel structures in the physical world. Quantum theory
introduces terms like wave functionand observablewith a di¤erent function.
They are not intended to mirror the physical world but to guide scientists and
other situated agents in better deploying representational resources they already
have or are engaged in developing. Even if an important long-term scientic aim
is improved symbolic representation of the physical world, science may at times
progress faster by introducing key terms without that representational function.
Language and other symbolic systems provide scientists and the rest of us with
wonderful tools for achieving our goals. But these tools dont always function in
the same way. Perhaps the central pragmatist moral of quantum theory is that
scientists may nd new ways of furthering long-term scientic aspirations by
creating theories whose key terms do not function as representations of physical
reality.
23
11 How to be a Quantum Realist
I have advocated a certain conception of scientic realism and argued that by
taking a pragmatist view one can see that quantum theory ts this conception.
A scientic realist should at least accept the existence of a physical world that
is largely independent of how we think of or observe it. So scientic realism
incorporates what I called Physical Realism. Quantum theory is compatible
with Physical Realism, in the pragmatist view of §4. While agreeing that there
is a physical world whose existence is independent of how we think of it, a Fuch-
sian participatory realist takes its development to be sensitive to our thoughts
through our intentional actions that precipitate an unpredictable observed re-
sponse. While I see this as a novel form of Physical Realism, others may count
it a rejection of this minimal scientic realist requirement.
As an epistemological optimist, a scientic realist should further maintain
that through our best science we have learned a lot about what the physical
world is like, including many of its features that we cannot observe through our
unaided senses. Applications of quantum theory have certainly led to successful
predictions and explanations of physical phenomena, many of which are in this
sense unobservable. The pragmatist view of §4 helps us understand how we
apply quantum theory in deepening our knowledge of these phenomena without
taking wave functions or other elements of its mathematical models to represent
beables. But for a QBist quantum theory has taught us little or nothing about
what the physical world is like: it has merely provided each agent with a tool
that is valuable in anticipating that agents future experiences when acting in
the physical world.
The most direct way a scientic theory could teach us about the physical
world is by itself describing it, or o¤ering mathematical models by which to
represent it. For a Quantum Scientic Realist, that is the only way we could
learn from quantum theory about the physical world. Adopting this restricted
conception of quantum realism has led to a proliferation of rival Interpretations
of quantum theory, each eager to extract a literally true story of what the
physical world is like from quantum theory itself. But pragmatism encourages
a wider perspective on how we might gain knowledge of the physical world. A
pragmatist who takes the view of §4 rejects Quantum Scientic Realism. She
sees quantum theory as a radically di¤erent kind of theory that teaches us about
the world not by o¤ering models by which to represent it, but by advising us
on how it may meaningfully be represented, and how likely is each meaningful
representation to be true. This is how quantum theory has taught us a lot, not
only about what the world is like but also about the scope and limitations of
our representations of it.
A scientic realist should reject a "thick" correspondence view of truth in
favor of a deationary account, and regard referential semantics as o¤ering an
analytic model of content rather than a substantive account of its origins. These
pragmatist attitudes to truth and reference underlie §4s pragmatist view of
quantum theory. By adopting an inferentialist account of how content accrues
to a statement, this pragmatist view shows how to eliminate all Bells [5] (p.215)
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proscribed words from a formulation of quantum theory with no measurement
problem while yielding a statement of the Born rule compatible with the "no-go"
theorems of [5], [28]. It also shows how to reconcile the existence of a unique,
objective, physical outcome of each successful quantum measurement with the
argument of [13].
William James presented his pragmatism as a conciliatory view in philoso-
phy. I think of §4s pragmatist view of quantum theory as o¤ering to reconcile
the views of Bohr and Einstein. If Bohr was right that acceptance of quantum
theory requires acknowledgment of the limits this puts on our abilities to speak
meaningfully about the physical world, perhaps Einstein was right to hold out
the hope that these limits may be transcended as quantum theory is succeeded
by an even more successful theory that gives us an approximately true, literal
story of what the physical world is like.
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